In this paper the concepts of Promises and Threats (P/T) are analysed in order to gain some insight on their nature and their relations. The aim is to study P/T persuasive aspects and their condition of use. This analysis serves also to investigate related concepts (such as offering, request, blackmail, giving orders, prize and punishments…).
PROMISES and THREATS

INTRODUCTION
In this section is delimitated the field of Promises and Threats (P/T). We begin with a very general definition that entails the concept of (social)commitment. After this, a definition of persuasion and dissuasion is introduced. Given these two general definitions of P/T and persuasion it is then possible to individuate four main classes of P/T. The distinction can be made along two dimensions. The first dimension is the presence or the absence, in the speaker, of the intention to influence the hearer to act in a desired way (persuasive aims). The second dimension refers to the presence or the absence of a conditional part in the message. In this article we will always use variable x to indicate the sender, and variable y the receiver, of the message. In modeling P/T we adopt the Beliefs, Desires, Intentions (BDI) model [Cohen & Levesque, 90; Cohen & Levesque, 90b] as a reference framework.
WHAT IS A 'PROMISE'
A Promise is, from a general point of view, a speech act that consist in the declaration, by x, of the intention of performing a certain action ax, under the condition that ax is something wanted by y, with the aim of entering into an obligation of doing ax (see Box 1) [Reinach, 13; Austin, 63; Searle, 69; Mulligan, 87]. A similar definition can be found in the Webster Dictionary: "In general, a declaration, written or verbal, made by one person to another, which binds the person who makes it to do, or to forbear to do, a specified act; a declaration which gives to the person to whom it is made a right to expect or to claim the performance or forbearance of a specified act." In modeling a promise, two concepts are necessary, the one of intention and the one of socialcommitment.
Intention = the notion of internal-commitment (intention) as defined by Bouron [Bouron, 92 ] along Cohen's suggestion. This kind of commitment establishes a relation between two entities: the agent x and the action ax.
INTEND ( x ax ) = GOAL ( x DOES ( x ax ) )
This formula defines the intention of x to perform action ax as the goal of x to perform action ax in the next time interval (for a thorough definition see [Cohen & Levesque, 90] ).
Social commitment = the notion of social commitment (S-commitment) [Castelfranchi, 1995] involves four entities: the agent x, the action ax (that x has the intention to perform, for which he takes the responsibility), the agent y for which action ax has some value (positive or negative), and an agent z before whom x is commited (the witness). In the definition of S-commitment the key point is that x is committed to do ax because y is interested in ax. So a S-commitment is a form of goal adoption 1 , and P/T are a particular form of Social commitment.
S-COMMITED ( x y ax z)
When x promises something ax to y she is committing herself to do ax. This is not simply an internal commitment, an intention to do that stabilize x choices and actions [Bratman, 87] , and it is not simply a 'declaration of a personal intention'. An intention declaration is not a 'promises' (as already clarified by Reinach, Austin, Searle, Mulligan) and does not bind the source so strongly: x is committed only with herself, she can change her mind and has to care only about the possible public impression of not being constant and persistent. Even a declaration of intention and a concession after a request is not necessarily a promise. It depends on the reasons. The adoption of y's goal should be a necessary motivating goal. For example, if y asks to x to go with him and x replies: "I will come! I really need and desire it", then if x doesn't come and y complains, x has the right to answer "I didn't promise, I have just said that I had the intention to come because I desired it". In general there is room for a legal dispute about the conditions and the shared beliefs for a real promise.
But if x promised something she cannot change her mind in the same way: she is committed to the other and with the other, and here is clear the importance of witness z. X has an interpersonal obligation -OBL ( x y DOES ( x ax )) -and creates some 'rights' in the other (see box below). To note that there is a 'bilateral dependence' (Mulligan, 1987 ) between x's obligation and y's claim and right. In fact they depends on each other: any 'right' is translated into and protected by some obligation for somebody else to avoid interferences with y's possible action. Y has entitled claims, and rights, since x is obliged; and x is obliged to do ax (does not simply intend to do ax) since y has rights on this.
It is important to remark that, when x promises, she is already S-committed to y to do ax, even if she may not have the intention to do (not being internally committed). Being sincere in promising (and also in threats) is not necessary for a P/T to be effective. It is sufficient that y believes that x is willing to do ax, and that y knows that x knows that she believes so. Using an enlightening example from the threatening case: if x says to y, with a fake gun: "I'm going to kill you", he is still threatening y, even if she does not actually intend to kill him. The promise is invalid if x's declaration is not serious (for ex. for fun) and this is manifest; i.e. if x knows (that y knows that x knows) that y knows that x is not seriously declaring, doesn't really have the intention to ax. The more formal and explicit the promise and the agreement the less subject to future interpretations and negotiations. The more implicit the two messages the more subjects to different views by x and y, and to contest.
This shows the interpersonal and non-internal nature of this commitment, of the real created and assumed 'obligation' to do ax (see also [Singh, 91] ).
Let us better represent these features of a Promise: Moreover, a promise presupposes (and requires) to be effective, i.e. to create the obligation/right, the (tacit) consent, agreement of y. It is not complete and valid for example if y refuses (see later on the difference between offering and promising).
a) x declare to y his intention to do ax a) UTTER ( x y INTEND ( x ax ) ) b) that is assumed to be in y's interest and as y likes,
WHAT IS A 'THREAT'
A threat is, from a general point of view, the declaration, by x, of the intention of performing a certain action ax, under the condition that ax is something not wanted by y. For the moment the only difference between P/T we address is the one of condition b: in threatening case, ax is something y dislikes (b1), this also means that the consent or agreement of y is neither presupposed nor required.
b1) GOAL ( y ¬DOES ( x ax ) )
This difference has other serious consequences that lead to a true and remarkable asymmetry between P and T. As we said P creates an obligation of x towards y, and corresponding rights of y about x's promised action. In this sense x is S-committed towards y. But this looks counter intuitive for T cases: if x says to y: "I will beat you", has y the right to claim and protest if x will not beat him? Is x obliged with y to beat him? 3 To find an answer, we first have to differentiate the two S-Commitments that P creates. This two Scommitments will also be used to distinguish between the concepts of promises and pseudo-promises (see section 3.3).
S1
. A S-commitment about the truth of what x is declaring (he takes responsibility for this) and this is the more basic meaning and kernel of 'promising' S2. A S-commitment that deals with the fact that in strict sense 'promising' refers to a future event under x's control. This is about the action that x has to accomplish in order to make true what he has declared. Now, in T the first commitment, about the responsibility of the truth of what has been declared, is there. Y can (and will) blame and make fun of x for not keeping his word on what threatened: he is ridiculous, non-credible, powerless, etc., and x cannot protest for this mocking. This is even more relevant in case of a public threat (or, in general, with witnesses); the reputation of x, his 'face' is compromised.
But for the second more important social-commitment to do ax, it seems that there is an important asymmetry between P and T (conditions d and d1). We will adjust this asymmetry (expressed by conditions d and d1) for Conditional-Influencing P/T (CIP/T) in section 4.2.
PROMISES AS PUBLIC GOAL ADOPTION (NOT MERE DECLARATION OF INTENTIONS)
Both in Promises and Threats, it is not strictly necessary that conditions (b) and (b1) hold before the P/T utterance. It is not necessary that ax is something already wanted (or not wanted) by y. It is sufficient that ax is wanted (or not wanted) after that the P/T is uttered. Thus, in the example "If you do your homework I will bring you to the cinema", it is not necessary that y has already the intention to go to the cinema. It is sufficient that this becomes a goal of the kid when his mother utters the promise; in other words the P/T can be based on the elicitation or activation of a non-active goal of y, and this can be part of the aims of x's plan. 4 Our analysis, so far, basically converges with Searle's one, although we believe that some crucial condition is missed or not well defined. In particular, in our view Searle missed the "adoption" condition, which is entailed by the notion of S-commitment (condition (d) of our analysis). In order to have a promise, it is not enough (as seems compatible with his 4 th condition and not well expressed in his 5 th condition) that -x declares (informs y) to have a give intention to do action ax -condition (a) of our analysis -x and y believe that y likes (prefers) that x does such an action -condition (b) of our analysis. This is not a promise. For example:
(E1) for his own personal reasons x has to leave, and informs y that he intends to leave, and he knows that y will be happy of this; but this is not a 'promise' to y, since x do not intend to leave (also) because y desire so.
The crucial fact is that while promising something to y, x is adopting a goal/desire of y's. It does not simply happens that y prefers x's action. x intends to do the action since and until she believes that it is a goal for y's. x's intention is "relativized" to this belief (see formula below).
REL-GOAL ( x DOES ( x ax ) GOAL ( y DOES ( x ax ) )
in fact COMMITED ( x y ax ) GOAL ( y DOES ( x ax ) )
PROMISING AND OFFERING
The concept of goal adoption allows us to distinguish the related notions of offering and promising: an offer is intended to obtain an acceptance, a consent on the adoption (x asks whether y likes/wants ax), while a promise presupposes it: (x assumes that y likes/wants ax and consent). In the case of promising the consent can be derived from a precedent explicit request of y or can be presupposed, and x is ready to stop if the acceptance is not obtained or revoked. In offering, since the acceptance (of y on ax) is not presupposed, x waits for an explicit consent. An evidence is given by the fact that, when y asks for a favor, x can promise to do it, but not offer to do it.
In the following formulas (P1 and P2), PP stand for the presupposition of the corresponding speech-act. The negation of the entire formula indicates the lack of the corresponding predicate in x beliefs set.
P1. PP-promise: BELIEVE (x CONSENT/ACCEPT ( y DOES ( x ax )))
P2. PP-offering: ¬ BELIEVE (x CONSENT/ACCEPT ( y DOES ( x ax )))
In P1 we have a true presupposition on the consent, in fact it holds also with the negation: "I do not/ cannot promise you that …" It remains that y like/want (and perhaps asked for) ax.
We can now analyze those cases in which the adoption is not request/wanted anymore. The commitment, and the following 'obligations', of x to do ax is relativized to her doing ax being a goal of y. The obligation (of the promise, of the offering) vanishes if y does no (longer) desires/requires ax and there are no other sources of commitment. The intention of x to perform ax, is relativised to the holding of condition b. So, for a felicitous promise the (tacit) acceptance of y is crucial. If y refuses, rejects x's adoption (his favor, help, promise) x is not committed anymore to do ax. This analysis is also valid for the threatening case, but in a reverse sense: the consent/acceptance is presupposed not to be given. The paradoxical joke of the sadist and the masochist, presented in Box 3, points out clearly this case:
Sadist: "I will beat you!" But y, in declaring she does not want x to perform ax, is not necessarily negating her need for ax, she is negating the whole condition b (could be the case that she still want a but not performed by x). There are different reasons that can bring y to reject x help, even if she is still in need for ax:
-not to feel in debt: "May I offer you the lunch?" (y refuses even if hungry)
-because she refuse the reason for which the promise is uttered: "Madam do you want to sit?" (on a bus, to an old lady that does not accept the implicit presupposition "since you are an old lady") -etc.
In sum: the fact that y prefers ax is among the motivating reasons of x's intention; the goal of making y realize his goal is a necessary motive of the intention.
THE NOTION OF PERSUASION
There is a strong relation between P/T and persuasion, P/T are often used as persuasive means. We think there is a lack of theory on their relation. After an overview of the different classes of P/T we will restrict our analysis to persuasive P/T. To this end we need a theory of persuasion (some preliminary ideas can be found in [Guerini et In fact, apart from physical coercion and the exploitation of stimulus-response mechanisms, the only way to make someone do something is to change his beliefs [Castelfranchi, 96] . If y is induced to cover his ears because x shouted, we cannot state that x has persuaded y.
We propose two different formalizations of persuasion, or better of "goal of persuading", (see formulae below). The two formulae, when y is an autonomous agent, are equivalent. It is important to note, first, that the goal of x is an intention, is not a self-realizing goal: x assumes that she has to act, to do something in order to induce y to ay. This is why x has an 'intention that' y does ay. Second, following (A2) in persuasion is presupposed by the speaker that the receiver is not already performing the required action ay. In a more strict definition it can also be presupposed that the receiver has some barriers against ay, y wouldn't spontaneously intend to do so. Persuasion is then concerned with the problem of finding means to overcome these barriers by conveying appropriate beliefs in the mind of y.
The relation between persuasion and dissuasion is non-trivial. Although "not performing an action" is a form of acting (considering dissuasion as persuasion to not perform a given action) the situation is not totally symmetrical. This becomes clear in analyzing the notion of 'intention', at least from a psychological point of view, there are three cases. The intention of performing ay (see formula 1), the intention of not performing ay (see formula 2), and the lack of intention (see formula 3).
INTEND ( y ay )
2. INTEND ( y ¬ay )
¬INTEND ( y ay )
Given this three cases it is important to note that while (h) is true:
this is not the case for the contrary (k):
Following the definitions given in 1 to 3 we can now model two different notions of persuasion and dissuasion: a) the weak notion, captures the idea that the receiver is not already planning to perform the required action; b) the strong notion, captures not only the idea that y is not already planning to perform ay, but also that he has some specific barriers against the action (y has some reason for not doing ay).
The terms "barriers/reasons" indicate those dispositions -of the receiver -that are against the action that the persuader wants him to perform. These 'reasons' are either 'goals' or 'beliefs' such that y actually or potentially (while considering the case) would/will not intend to do ay. In our approach barriers are modeled as intentions (contrary intentions) the user already has and that are endangered by the required action. In particular, for any given action ay, the contrary intention is modeled as the intention of performing ¬ay (see 2).
The concept of persuasion, given these premises, can be divided along two cases: a) WEAK CASE: from the lack of the intention to the intention In the strong case there is more resistance because these barriers require a double passage: first making y to drop the contrary intention of not performing ay (so going back to the case of the lack of intention) and then to adopt the intention of performing it. It can be also argued that if there's a lack of intention it is because the pros and cons of ay are balanced in y beliefs set (or not computed) while if there is a contrary intention is because the cons of ay are stronger (so persuasion is harder to be reached).
Considering the concept of barriers involved in the process of persuasion, the intuitive notion of persuasion refers to the strong cases. And, as we will argue later (see section 1.6.1), P/T, when used as persuasive means, refer only to the strong cases of persuasion as well. In fact there are more appropriate means to persuade (like asking for a favour) when the persuasive interaction involves a weak case. It would be strange if x were to say to a passer-by: "If you don't tell me the time I will kill you". 
From intending the action to intending not to do it
INTEND ( y ay ) INTEND ( y ¬ay )
This second case is stronger: y is not simply dropping an intention, he is not letting it evaporate: he is deciding not to act.
We can say that Strong P implies Dissuasion; while Strong T implies Persuasion.
THE MAIN CLASSES OF PROMISES AND THREATS
There are four main classes of promises and threats. The distinction can be made along two dimensions: (a) presence of a conditional part in the P/T message, (b) presence of a persuasive aim in x.
a) Some promises are conditional in their nature (e.g. "If tomorrow is sunny I will bring you to the zoo", "If you do your homework I will bring you to the cinema"). This dimension refers to the presence or the absence of a conditional part in the message b) The second dimension is the presence or the absence, in the speaker, of a persuasive goal, of the intention to influence the hearer to act in a desired way. If the predicate PERSUADE ( x y ay ) holds, we are in the influencing class (specific case of P/T). This dimension is the most important in the division of P/T.
The overall situation can be depicted as in table 1. The interesting thing is that there's a "lack of theory" in English and Italian: in fact it seems that there are no terms to describe these different classes 5 .
NON-CONDITIONAL "I will ax" (IP/T) "I will ax" (P/T) After a brief analysis of the various classes we will focus on conditional-influence, the one we consider central from a persuasive perspective.
NON INFLUENCING CLASSES
Conditional, non-influencing: this group restricts the s-commitment on ax to the holding of a certain condition c. If the condition does not hold x has no duty on ax:
"If c then ax" as in: "If tomorrow is sunny I will bring you to the zoo". The conditional part "if tomorrow is sunny" refers to a contingent situation -to a condition -of the world that must hold in order for the speaker to be committed and to keep his promises (or threats). This uttering doesn't want to influence in any way the hearer. The overall s-commitment of x (entailed in every P/T) is a conditional commitment:
This predicate means that x has the goal to perform the action ax, but under condition c. There's an interesting sub-class of this group: the one that contains (in the conditional part) a reference to an action ay of the hearer. This reference could lead to confusion with conditional-influence group. When x says "If tomorrow you are at office I will come to visit you" he does not want to influence the hearer to be to the office the next day (formula f1) but, as in the example of the sunny day for the zoo, he is just expressing a condition that must hold for his promise to work (formula f2). The discrimination for being non influencing is given exactly by condition f1.
Moreover the conditional part seems to refer to indirect-question more than promises and threats (we can translate the above example in "Will you be at your office tomorrow?").
Non-conditional, non-influencing: the theories presented so far, and what stated up to now refer mainly to this cases. This group presents itself in the form:
Usually this group refers to cases in which the speaker is trying to reciprocate or to revenge (as in "I will buy you a house" and in "I will kill you") or to cases of disinterested favours. So the action, promised or threaten, is not aiming to induce a future action of the hearer, but, on the contrary, can be: a) a response to an action already performed by the hearer.
b) a favour without any expected counterpart.
The only predicates that old in this case are the ones of social-commitment.
THE INFLUENCING CLASSES: IP/T
In the influencing class the questions that are central for its analysis are: why should x perform an action positive or negative for y? And why x should want to communicate this to y? This is done exactly with the aim of inducing y to perform (not to perform) some other action (ay). This is obtained by artificially linking a new effect to the action ay, and this effect is exactly ax (formula c). This is the very nature of Influencing P/T (IP/T).
GOAL ( x DOES ( y ay ) ) or GOAL ( x ¬DOES ( y ay ) )
As it will appear clear in the ongoing, the two classes of IP/T can be considered both as conditional, because this is entailed by the influencing nature of IP/T. The only point is to highlight why the speaker, in some situations, leaves implicit the conditional part. After a brief analysis of the two classes we will analysis IP/T class as coincident to the CIP/T one.
CONDITIONAL, INFLUENCING CLASS: general structure
This is the most important class for our analysis. It is usually called "conditional influencing (i.e. persuasive) promise-threat". It has the form:
"If ay then ax"
More precisely:
a conditional-influencing promise has the form:
"if you do ay (a cost for you), I will do ax (a prize for you)"
a conditional-influencing threat has the form:
"if you do ay (a prize for you), I will do ax (a cost/penalty for you)"
The special structure of CIP/T is that the Condition of the CIP/T ("if p") is equal to, and indirectly expresses, the achievement or avoidance goal of the act; i.e. in P the Condition is what the speaker want to achieve, while in T Thus, any act of conditional-influencing promise has the following typical plan-structure: it has a higher goal that p (influencing: that is that DOES (y ay) 6 ) and the message (a speech act) (Searle) is aimed at this goal; while the same proposition p is represented in the condition of the committed action of x.
Picture 1
Any act of conditional-influencing threat has the same structure, except that the influencing goal and the condition are one the opposite of the other: p and ¬p. (For additional important differences in the plan, see 3.5 since in fact in P x really plans to di ax, while in T really plan not to do ax).
Picture 2
Moreover, ax in Picture 1 is a prize for y, while in Picture 2 is a punishment for her (and, in Picture 2 y is per se probably willing to realize p, while in Picture 1 y is presumably not willing to do so). 6 More precisely since y is a cognitive agent: INTEND ( y DOES ( y ay ) )
For the moment is sufficient to say that in threats ax is not wanted by y because it jeopardizes some of his goals, and ay is not wanted by the speaker for the same reason.
Two examples are: "If you don't pay I will kill you" and "If you do your homework I will bring you to the cinema".
CIT AND BLACKMAIL
An interesting example for our analysis is the notion of blackmail. It is a conditional persuasive threat with an additional negative moral connotation, due to the violation of a norm. So its status is context dependent. Let's consider example E4: (E4) If persuader says "If you pay me one million euros I will save you" we cannot say that this is a blackmail tout court. If y is drowning in a river and x utters the above sentence with a life buoy in his hands, this is clearly a blackmail because there is a norm that state to save people in danger (if you have the opportunity to do it). The same utterance, instead, is perfectly acceptable if x is an economical consultant called by y, the president of a society risking bankruptcy.
The concept of blackmail covers only the conditional influencing cases of threats -CIT -(but with a special moral connotation), while the concept of threat covers also the non-conditional non-influencing ones.
The conditional influencing nature of blackmail allow us also to discover the core of the problem involved by emotional blackmail. The problem is that we perceive affection as unconditional. A "conditional" affection is perceived as immoral. We cannot "bargain" our affection, our emotions, to induce a beloved to act in the way we want.
Going deeply in x's plan about y's mind and action, it is worth noticing that x in fact not only is proposing an 'exchange' of reciprocal 'adoptions', but is proposing to y also the reasons for intending and adopting. x intends that y prefers to adopts x's goal in order to obtaining reciprocation (x's adoption) in order to obtaining his goal: the result of ax. X not only induces y's behavior but provides her also a reason and a motive for it. [Castelfranchi, 99] 
NON-CONDITIONAL, INFLUENCING CLASS
This class presents itself in the form:
as in non-conditional, non-influence, but it is for influencing and sometimes is similar to the conditional one. In fact sometimes the difference with this last class just relies on the fact that despite there's the intention to influence the hearer the conditional part, in the message, is left implicit because: a) it is supposed to be derivable from the context; and b) it could perhaps be the case that, knowing the conditional part, y will not perform what required.
The first case is not interesting at all since it is, from a cognitive point of view, the same as in conditional influencing one: the same predicates olds. As an example: the kid is not doing his homework but is playing, the mother comes and, pointing at the books on the desk says "I won't bring you to the cinema". There's an implicit reference to the conditional part "if you don't do your homework".
The second case is more interesting because reflects a particular situation in which the conditional part must not be communicate in order for persuasion to work. This is the case, for example, of a young girl saying to an old rich men "I will always love you". The conditional part is "if you cover me with money". If the conditional part was uttered the hold man would not do ay. This is because of two possible reasons:
1. he believed her love to be disinterested 2. he just appreciate her hypocrisy in saving social conventions.
In the case of the first interpretation we really are in the class that we are characterizing: not implicit condition for influencing, but influencing with a non-conditional promise.
These promises are neither explicitly nor implicitly 'conditional', they are not aimed at an 'exchange' of favors. x's adoption is not conditioned to p (y doing ay), although it is finalized to p. x intends to elicit a given behavior in y as a consequence/reaction to x's favor but not as a 'negotiated' counterpart of her own favor, but -for example -out of sympathy, gratitude, reciprocation, emulation, etc.
THE COMPLEX NATURE OF IP/T AS "REQUEST" SPEECH ACTS
The influencing class has, from a cognitive point of view, a very complex nature. When x utters the sentence, he has the goal that y believes that x is going to favour or to damage him (G1). And this is one of the motivating goals of his communicative act. This goal has then the super-goal (G2) to induce in y the intention to do ay (or not to do it). Finally G2 has another super-goal (G3) to induce y to perform ay (which is the ultimate, proper, goal of IP/T). This complex cognitive structure is depicted in Picture 3. The distinction between the goal of x that y intends ay (G2), and the goal of x that y will do it (G3), is explicated by the notion of PERSUADE (the two definitions of persuasive goal): to induce someone to act in a given desired way (definition A2), by creating the corresponding intention of acting (definition A1). This distinction is necessary to capture those cases in which promises and threats are used simply to create an intention, as in the example E2 below.
(E2) x, a lackey of a mafia boss, promises to y, another lackey of the same boss, to give him one million euros (ax) if he helps him to kill the boss (ay). But x wants just to show to the boss that y is not loyal. So the overall goal of his promise is just that y intends to kill the boss (G2), and not that he actually does it (G3).
Given this analysis it appears clear that IP/T represent some sort of request (particular kind of Searle's speech act) since y has to do something for x, adopting x's goals under x's influence.
A set-based description of the influencing class, along with the others, is given in Picture 4.
The problem is: why to make resort to this particular form of request? There are different persuasive acts (like asking for, argumenting, promising) with different "costs", that can be used. P/T are the ones with the higher cost (compared to the corresponding requesting and argumenting forms). In fact, given that every action has a cost, if y carries out ay, then x is committed to carry out ax (on this see section 3.5 on P & T asymmetry, and section 3.6 on the paradox of P/T impossibility and inefficacy). Why not simply asking y for performing ay? In this case if y performs ay, x does not need any additional effort. And even if, after a request, y does not perform ay, x has still the possibility to argument on the advantages, for y, to perform ay.
The answer to this problem relies on the necessity (following x) of using rewards (defined as "incentives", see section 3.2) and on the different presuppositions that lead to different persuasive acts.
1. In simple request y is presupposed to have no contrary intentions on ay.
2. In argumenting the presupposition is that, even if it could be that y has some contrary intentions, when he will come to know all the outcomes of ay he will perform it.
3. In P/T instead the presupposition is not only that y has some contrary intentions, but also that there is no pure argumentative way to make him change his mind: it is sufficient neither to ask, nor to prospect natural consequences (positive or negative) of y's acts, so it is necessary for x to intervene with his power. So, an influencing promise is a sort of combination between two different (linguistic) acts, an offer of ax and a request of ay. In particular the offer is conditioned to the request.
THE RELATION BETWEEN PERSUASION/DISSUASION AND IP/T
In common sense, promises are for persuading, inducing to do, while threats are for dissuading. But this is not true: we can use promises for dissuading or threat for persuading. The complete spectrum is depicted in table 2 ("+" means a benefit for x, "-" means a disadvantage). There is also a more indirect relationship between P and Dissuasion and T and Persuasion/induction to do, in term of plans. Also a P for persuading to do something (not to abstain from something) can in fact be a maneuver for inducing y to abandon a given goal in conflict with the induced one. Suppose that y intends to do a1y and x dislikes this; x can persuade y by a promise to do a2y which is incompatible with a1y. X's aim is not that y does a2y but that she (for doing a2y and obtaining x's price) abandons the intention of a1y. The same holds for threats: x can threat and dissuade y from doing a1y just in because he assumes that while abandoning a1y she will move to intend a2y, which is x's aim. This is a hidden, non declared, maneuver, i.e. an example of influencing strategy that we call 'manipulation': 'persuading' (better 'inducing') without that y understands our intention to induce her to do something. There seems to be a relevant semantic difference between 'persuading' in strict sense and 'inducing': in persuading to do something it seems that x has the (instrumental) goal that y understands that he intends to change her mind and induce her to do something. 'Induction' can be fully hidden. "Occult persuasion" looks to be an oxymoron, a paradox; it can be used just because applies to advertisements that by definition have a persuasive aim.
A: Persuading
CONDITIONS, POWER, and CREDIBILITY for PROMISES and THREATS
From now on when talking about promises and threats we refer to Conditional Influencing Promises and Threats (CIP/T).
ARTIFICIAL CONSEQUENCES AS PERSUASIVE MEANS IN IP/T
In our analysis x can persuade y by prospecting to y "natural" positive or negative consequences of ay, that is possible advantages or disadvantages of y's choice ("It might be better for you to do ay, because…"). But in P/T x has additional ways to persuade y to do ay:
• x acts by communication in order to induce y to do a given action (ay) through the prospect of positive outcomes (whose acquisition is preferable) due to x's power and intervention (ax), not natural consequence of ay • x acts by communication in order to induce y to do a given action (ay) through the prospect of negative outcomes (whose avoidance is preferable) due to x's power and intervention (ax), not natural consequence of ay.
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In persuasive P/T outcomes are linked to ay in an artificial way; they are not natural effect of it. We use the terms "natural" and "artificial" in a technical way. Artificial means that the consequence is under the control (direct or indirect) of x and will not happen without his intervention.
This definitions include also the case in which is not x himself that performs ax but a third, delegated, agent z (e.g. a killer). The fact is that this third agent will perform ax only if requested, and because delegated, by x.
So x does not limit himself to prospect to y positive or negative consequences of her action as is usually done in argumentation; the positive or negative consequences depend on x intervention. The discrimination can be made along the following example:
(E3) A general gives the order to attack an enemy position. The soldiers know that if they refuse, they can be sent to the martial court and condemned to death. But this order is not an (implicit) threat because there is a norm that regulates these cases. If the general says "I will send you to the martial court" he is not threatening to condemn them to death, he is threatening the appeal to the norm. The one who applies the norm, who punish the soldiers, (the court) is different from the one who makes appeal to the norm (the general), the court is not under the general control. So in usual cases an order is an appeal to a norm, not a threat. The case is different if the general orders to the second lines to point their guns against the first lines and to shot them if they don't obey. In this case the order to attack is a conditional threat because the one who apply the norm, the sanction (to be killed), is the same that makes an appeal to it (the general); the artificial negative consequence is directly under the control of persuader.
So, with IP/T arguments are "built" and not "found". Thus, in our ontology:
k1) "if you finish your homework your mother will bring you to the cinema"
is not necessarily a promise (it can be a mere prediction). Instead
k2) "if you finish your homework I will tell your haunt to bring you to the cinema"
is a promise of the mother to her child. 7 It is important to remark that 'not doing a' is an action (when is the output of a decision). Thus x can induce y to not doing something.
These two examples show that being natural or artificial is strictly context dependent, and does not depend solely on the presence of an agent in the delivering of the outcome. In example k1 the same consequence of k2 (to be bring to the cinema) is used by the speaker in an argumentative way, by making the other believe or consider some benefits coming from her own action. These outcomes do not depend on the intervention of the speaker. He is "promising" nothing in our vocabulary 8 , while this is the case for example k2 where the deliverer (the haunt) is under the control of the speaker.
THE NOTION OF "INCENTIVES"
The notion of "artificial (positive or negative) outcomes" allows bridging our theory with the notion of "incentives". In fact, we consider IP/T as social acts based on the prospect of incentives. And the term "incentives" signify precisely those artificial consequences that are delivered -by x to y -in order to influence y. These incentives can be positive or negative: prize or punishments (see table 3 ).
Incentives
Prospected artificial consequences used in P/T 9
Prices
Positive artificial consequences (Positive incentives) used in P So prizes and punishments are exactly the action ax (promised or threaten) in the conditional-influencing class of P/T. In our analysis, the following predicate denotes the specific notion of conditional influencing P/T:
Punishments
Negative artificial consequences (Negative incentives) used in T
PERSUADE ( x y ay ax )
In particular: a) If ax is something given because is wanted by y, then it is a prize:
Goal ( y ax ) PRICE ( ax ) b) If ax is something given because is not wanted by y, then it is a punishment:
In table 4, we have a summary of the different typologies of outcomes of ay with the corresponding term to indicate them. Incentives, promises and threats are on line B; prospected natural outcomes, instead, are on line A. Argumentation refers to line A, while persuasion uses everything. Persuasion is, in our view a super-class of argumentation strategies as well as P/T, since it concerns all the means to induce someone to act in a given, desired, way. In Hopecasts or Positive Expectations the agent both believes (more or less firmly) that p will be true, and desires/wishes that p.
In Fearcasts or Negative Expectations the agent both believes (more or less strongly) that p will be true, while desires/wishes that not-p. She worries about p.
A simple promise is aimed at creating in y a positive expectation (Hopecast), while adopting the potential goal of y and providing it with a combined belief that it will be true (as for what depends on x).
A simple threat is aimed at creating in y a negative expectation (Fearecast), while adopting the opposite of y's goal (the goal of damaging y) and providing it with a combined belief that it will be true (as for what depends on x).
There are several possible purposes of such an act of creating hopes or worries in y (like make her be quite or be anxious, etc.), which are beyond the scope of this paper. Here we focus on P/T as persuasion act.
A CIP/T act creates an expectation (while focusing on the positive or on the negative side) in order to modify y's mental scenario in decision making, and precisely the expected utility and prospected outcomes of her action.
This difference -between incentives and simple advantages -is the reason why meteorologists cannot really "promise" good weather, even if they can, and possibly want, create in the audience hopecasts or fearcasts, by means of their (weather) forecast. They do not have control over weather.
Meteorologist can at most 'assure' that, 'firmly assert' that, 'guarantee' that, but not really 'promise' that. When one uses the verb 'to promise' about a fact and not an act, it does not express a real promise (where the speaker commit himself to do something in the interest of the addressee) but what we call a Pseudo-Promise. In fact, when x promises about an action of another autonomous agents z, the real meaning of the sentence is about his own intervention for producing z's behavior: "I promise you that z
POSITIVE OUTCOMES NEGATIVE OUTCOMES
will come" means (at least in Italian) "I promise you to make z come".
The distinction between Promises and Pseudo-promises is a technical one, not lexical analysis; at least as for the English term. Unfortunately the meaning of the English verb "to promise" mixes up different things and does not coincide with the semantic of the original Latin notion and with the meanings of several other languages: Italian, French, Spanish, etc. In English "to promise" can even refer to past events, or to event not controlled by x (like in the meteorologist example), and mean -in those cases -"I guarantee, I assure you that, I'm sure" (See for example the use of 'promising' cited in the Webster Dictionary's definition: "v.i.1 To give assurance… 2 To afford hopes or expectation; to give ground… 'Will not the ladies be afraid of the lion?' 'I fear it, I promise you'). This meaning represent the kernel of the English definition. We capture this kernel with the first 3 lines of our definition in section 1.2 ('to take the responsibility for the thruth of the declaration'). However, our full notion just refers to actions/intentions of x and to future events under his control.
There are other interesting uses of 'promising' that enlighten crucial constituents. For example in "clouds promise rain" the use of 'promising' is a bit metaphorical: only a sub-part of the lexical meaning is preserved: (a) "they signify a future event: rain" (like in "clouds announce rain"); (b) "that depends on them and they will produce themselves"
Using the distinction, pointed out in section 1.3, between S-commitments (S1) and (S2), we can analyze also the different obligations generated on x by Promises and Pseudo-promises. In both promises and pseudo-promises the speaker is contracting a commitment with the addressee about the truth of what he is declaring (S1), in both cases he is making himself 'responsible' and liable for a message like:
"If what I'm saying turns out to be false, you can complain with me, I respond of this"
But there is a crucial difference:
1. In a Pseudo-Promise (like "I guarantee/promise/assure you that a certain event will occur"), since it is about something that is out of x control, only S-Commitment S1 is valid (commitment about the assertion).
2. In a Promise (like "I guarantee/promise/assure you that I will do ax"), since it is about something that is under x control, x is committing himself both on S-commitment S1 and S2 (commitment about a future action of him): "What I say is (will be) true, I guarantee so (S1); (because) I will myself do or realize what I say (S2)".
As a consequence in Pseudo-Promise, if what x says come out to be false, y can blame x only because she induced him to believe so, not because she did not produce the outcome. In Promise instead, y can also blame x because she did not realize in practice what she guaranteed.
APPLICABILITY, OPPORTUNITY CONDITIONS and THE POWER OF X
1) Applicability conditions:
The fact that the loss or gain for y is due to x decision and intervention, explains why, in order a promise or a threat to be "credible", it is crucial that y believes that x has the bale and in condition to favor or to damage her, that she is depending on x as for those goals, and x is really willing to do ax (in case). Thus when x enounces his promise or threat he also has the goal that y believes that x has the "power of" ax; this belief of y is x's "credibility" as promisor or threater. It is the trust of y in x (in case of promise) and the paradoxical "trust" of y in x in case of threat. It can be based on x reputation, on previous experience, on some showing up or demonstration of power, etc.
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Thus in order to have true promises or threats of x to y, x must have some Power over y; the power of providing to y incentives (or at least y must believe so). More analytically, -x has some Power of doing ax
CAN-DO ( x ax )
-y depends on x, and more precisely on his action ax, as for achieving some goal Gy; ax Gy ; DEPEND (y x ax Gy) y depends on x as for achieving her goal Gy thanks to x's action ax. This means that:
-x gets a power over y's goal Gy, the power of giving incentives or not to y by the realization of Gy;
POWER-OVER ( x y Gy )
-both x and y believe so; on such a basis
BMB ( x y POWER-OVER ( x y Gy ) )
-x gets a Power of Influencing y to do ay while using the promise of Gy (performing ax) as incentive in persuasion 11 .
PERSUADE ( x y ay ax )
That is, x can make y believe that "if y performs ay (adopts the goal of x) then x will reward her by performing ax (adopting y's goal)".
2) Opportunity conditions:
The above conditions represent the applicability conditions for P/T, but there's still another condition to be met in order to make P/T effective:
-Threatening: If x has the power to jeopardize a goal Gy of y, and the goal has a higher value V than the value of the action (ay) x wants him to perform, then x can threaten y to jeopardize the goal if he does not perform the required action.
V(Gy) > V(ay)
-Promising: If x has the power to help y achieve a goal (Gy), and the goal has a higher value V than the value of the action x wants him to perform (ay), then x can promise to help him realize his goal if he performs the required action.
Opportunity conditions regard the effectiveness of the message, not his being a true promise or threat: "If you carry that heavy bag for me for five kilometres I will give you 20 cents". This is a true promise but the problem is that it will not work because the value of ay (carrying the heavy bag for five kilometres) is much greater the value of Gy (gaining 20 cents).
AN ASYMMETRY BETWEEN P AND T: the plan to do ax vs. the plan of not doing ax.
As we said in order to be efficacious the promised or threatened action ax has to have for y more value than the action requested by x for y 12 :
V(ax) > V(ay). ax is y's incentive.
On the other side, on the perspective of x the promised action ax (that is x's cost) has to have less value than the value of ay. For x: V(ax) < V(ay). It represents x's costs. However, there is a very interesting asymmetry between P and T under this respect, if we consider P/T where ax is an action to be performed, not the abstaining fron an action.
In x's Promise plan, x -if sincere -plans (intends) to do ax in order to obtain ay. In case of a successful P it is expected that x performs ax. Only in case of failure, of y's refuse and indifference to the P, x plans not to do ax.
On the contrary, in T x successful plan includes the non execution of ax. That should be executed only in case of failure and y's refusal. The threatened action is planned for not being carried out. 13 This difference is especially important in substantial P vs. substantial T (see later).
In P ax is something that has to be invested for obtaining ay. But the relation is very different in T. x does not plan to spend ax; if everything goes right he should not perform ax: it is a cost not to be paid. 14 Under this respect a T looks more convenient than a P: a successful T has only communication/negotiation costs; while a P has negotiation costs plus the promised incentive (again this especially applies to substantial T & P). The promised incentive, in case of T, is not doing ax, abstaining from it. 15 In P x plans and accepts that he has to carry out ax; while in T x wishes not to be obliged to carry out ax. There are serious limits in this 'convenience' of (substantially) threatening respect to promising, not only from the point of view of social capital and collective interest, but from x's point of view. In fact in those kinds of relationships y is leaning to exit from the relation it self, to subtract herself from x (bad) power and influence. It requires a lot of activity of control and repression for maintaining 12 V(ax) for y is equivalent to V(Gy) since ax gy people under subjection and blackmail. This is why also for the 'Prince' (Machiavelli) its convenient combining forms of domination based on violence and punishments, with forms based on leadership, or favors, or promises of advantages.
In T, if y does as required by x (goal adoption), x has no motive for doing Ax (on the contrary has a sort of interpersonal Obligation of not doing so -section 2.4). In P, if y does as required by x (goal adoption), x has motives (and in particular an obligation) for carrying out ax.
In both cases there is a common conditional structure:
If y will do ay, x will do something; and x wishes to have to do it since this means that has obtained ay. But while in P the "something" is the beneficial ax for y, in T "something" is not doing the detrimental ax for y; thus x's wishes are rather different: in P x 'wishes' of doing ax; in T x wishes of not doing ax 16 .
THE SCHELLING PARADOX: why P and T shouldn't be credible
As we said, in threats the threatened act (detrimental for y) should be executed only in case of failure of the threat (if Y is indifferent to the threat), but why and for what purpose performing it and having useless costs? [Schelling, 60] . Surely not for achieving the original goal -DOES (y ay) -. Thus, it seems irrational to do what has been threatened. Why should x do it after the threat has already failed?
Moreover, that this action would be useless for x should be clear also to y, but this makes x's threat non credible at all: y knows that x (if rational) will not do what he threats if y does not accept; so why accepting?
Analogously, the promised action (beneficial for y) usually 17 has to be performed by x in case of success (after y's induced action), so why should x spend his resources when he already obtained his goal? But this too is known by y and should make x's promise not very credible.
As Shelling suggests, threats (and promises) should be gradable, performable in steps: where the first steps are also behavioral messages, demonstration of the real power and intention to do what promised/threatened, warnings or "lessons" still aimed at inducing y. This is true, however, it is just a sub-case; the general solution of this paradox of P/T impossibility and inefficacy (they are not credible for y because there is no reason/incentive for x for doing what he promised after the success of P or the failure of T) has to be found in additional and different reasons and motives of X for doing what he is committed to do in relation with the result of the CIP/T. Let's consider threats.
Why after the failure x should waste his resources for harming y? It is a maneuver for other purposes and for the future. As a "lessons" it is aimed at teaching, at making y learning (for future interactions with x or with others) that (x's) threats are credible, that x really has the power to do so, and his to be taken seriously. Moreover, this can be aimed at maintaining the reputation of x in the group as a coherent and credible person: there might be witnesses of x threats, or y herself might spread around x's reputation, and reputation is a capital to be preserved. Another motive can be just rage and the desire (satisfaction) of punishing, penalizing y (that frustrated x's desire); some sort of 'reciprocation', TIT for TAT. And so on. In keeping promises after success -a part from investing in reputation capital -there might be 'reciprocation' motives, or fairness, or morality, etc.
If these additional motives are known by y, they makes x's P/T credible; but it is important to have clarified that:
-if x performs what he promised it is not in order to obtain what he asked for.
THE JANUS NATURE OF CIP/T: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CHOICE
Superficially promises and threats are two different acts, but a deeper analysis shows that in fact there's no threat without promise and there's no promise without threat: they are complementary; two faces of just one and the same act.
LOGICAL FORM OF CIP/T: NO PROMISE WITHOUT THREAT AND VICEVERSA.
If x has the goal that p -DOES ( y ay )-this analytically is the goal that will not be the case that y does not ay (¬¬ p). X can either plan for inducing y to p (persuade to p) or for diverting y from not p (dissuade from not-p).
Thus x can say:
"if p I will give you a positive incentive" (promise);
or:
"if ¬p I will give you a negative incentive" (threat).
In those case, where one act is only the implicit counterpart, the hidden side of the other (p vs. ¬p), the positive and negative incentives too are simply the negation of one the other ("I will do ax" vs. "I will not do ax"). Also for this reason, one side can remain implicit; because it is automatically derivable from the explicit part. A threat is aimed at inducing an avoidance goal, while a promise is aimed at eliciting attraction, but they co-occur in one and the same influencing act and cooperate in one plan pushing y in one and the same direction.
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The problem is that every promise and threat has a surface IF-THEN form. Our claim is that, despite this, the true/deep logical form of "if" in CIP/T is an IFF 19 . As we said, there's no threat without promise and there's no promise without threat: they are complementary.
When one says "if you do your homework I will bring you to the cinema" (promise) necessarily means "while if you do not do your homework I will not bring you to the cinema" (threat); that is "I will bring you to the cinema if and only if…". If x would bring y to the cinema in both cases (and y realizes this) the promise would obviously be ineffective.
In the (intuitive) equivalence between:
"if you talk I will kill you" (threat)
"if you don't talk I will not kill you" (promise) the logical IF-THEN interpretation doesn't work:
( ay ax ) ≠ ( ¬ay ¬ax ) while this is the case for the IFF interpretation:
The IF-THEN of promise/threat is not the IF-THEN of logic but an IFF. And this IFF form allows (and explains why) it is possible to shift from promises to threats and vice versa. From ay ↔ ax, "if you talk I will kill you", to ¬ay↔ ¬ax, "if you don't talk I will not kill you".
This "asymmetry" between linguistical and logical form (IF-THEN vs. IFF) can be explained, from a linguistical point of view, by the concept of "implicature" [Grice, 75] . In fact, when threatening/promising y, x must be:
1. complete: x must give all the important information; the mother cannot say, once the kid has done his homework "I will not bring you to the cinema because I also wanted you to wash the dishes".
not redundant:
if the mother brings the kid to the cinema even if he hasn't done the homework, then the conditional part of the promise would be unnecessary (it would have been an unconditional non-influencing promise).
CONDITIONAL PROMISE AND THREAT AND THEIR COMMITMENTS
The analysis just introduced on logical structure of CIP/T allows us, now, to define the different kinds of commitments entailed by promises and threats (points d and d1 of our analysis, see section 1.3).
In [Castelfranchi, 95] we find the definition of Social-Commitment (S-Comm) proposed as a four place predicate:
COMMITTED (x y ax z)
if this predicate holds then must also hold y's 'consent' and agreement:
As we already saw (Section 1.3 and note 3) apparently, threats, differently from promises, seems to fall out our analysis in terms of S-commitment. In fact, what on which who threats is committed (i.e. "I will kill you") is not, superficially, a y goal. If x does not keep his commitment, y won't protest, neither we can say that y has the right to protest. In fact, a 'right' is the protection, by a social or legal norm, of an interest or possible goal of y. But this is only the surface structure of threat, at least for Conditional T: as we have already seen every CIT entails a promise; when x says "If you speak I will kill you" he means (implicatures) "If you don't speak I won't kill you".
So -at least for Conditional P/T -the asymmetry is only apparent and can be solved: the S-commitment in the threat, between x and y is taken on the corresponding promise form. This difference between surface and deep structure, this iff form of promise and threats let us explain how, even a threat, can be considered as a S-commitment. In fact GOAL ( y (DOES x ax )) still holds but ax now is the action of "not killing y". So:
1. Promise: (COMMITTED x y a z)
In the first case y can protest if x does not perform the action, in the second, instead, y can protest if x performs the action 20 .
But let's go deeply in the Commitment structure of CIP vs. CIT. What we need, is the concept of "Reciprocal Conditional Commitment", and, to be more specific of "Pact" -or "Mutual S-commitment" -in which the commitment of x with y is conditioned to the commitment of y with x and vice versa.
In fact any P presupposes -as we argue -the 'agreement', the acceptance of y (and is not valid in front of an explicit refuse of her). This means that y too takes a S-Commitment towards x to accept his 'help' and to rely on his action [Castelfranchi, 95 ]: x will be upset if while acting for the benefit of y, realizes that y did already solve the problem, or asked to somebody else, or changed her mind. He will protest for this and is entitled to protest. In our view an accomplished promise is a Multi-Agent act, it requires two participants, two acts, two messages and outputs with two commitments. It seems necessary to gothank to the notion of conditional reciprocal goal-adoption -beyond the enlightening notion of Reinach ( [Reinach, 13] ; cited and discussed in [Mulligan, 87]) of 'social act' as an act which is etherodirected, that needs the listening and "grasping" (ital."afferramento") of the addressee (what we call (implicit) acceptance and agreement) otherwise is "insatur" (unfinished). In fact if y rejects x's promise we just have an attempt of P, not a complete act with its results (commitments).
Moreover, there's the need of a distinction between "negative pacts" (based on threats) and "positive pacts" (based on promises). These two different pacts entails different S-commitments.
As we saw, in P x proposes to y to 'adopt' her goal (ax) if y adopts his own goal (ay); he proposes a reciprocal goal-adoption, and exchange of favors. In other words, in CIP x is proposing a reciprocal SCommitment, a reciprocal P of benefits. In prototypical CIT form it is rather different: we have the other, complementary face. x is proposing to y an exchange of abstentions from harm and disturb: "if you do not do what I dislike, I will not harm you". The reciprocal S-Commitments are formulated of avoidances and motivated by avoidance, in both x and y.
DEEP AND SURFACE CIP/T & THEIR GRAMMAR
Only a superficial and pragmatic difference distinguish between P and T as two faces of just one and the same act (and relation). However, common sense and language seem to have the intuition of something deeper, not just a difference of form or face. And in fact when for example we think of a blackmail we feel a sense of hypocrisy considering it as a 'promise', and there is something strange while considering a real promised award as a threat. What is missed is an additional dimension, where more typical promises refer to real gains, while more typical threats refer to losses and aggression.
What stated so far about the logical form leads us to put forward the proposal about the division of (conditional-influence) promises and threats along two orthogonal dimensions: the deep and surface one. The deep dimension regards the gain and losses for the receiver related to speaker's action. With "gain" and "losses" we refer respectively to:
(a) the fact that one realizes a goal that does not already have, passing from the state of Goal p & not p, to the state that Goal p & p (an acquisition, the realization of an 'achievement' goal in Cohen-Levesque terminology); when one does not achieve we have a 'missed gain': the welfare of the agent is not increased (nor decreased -except for the possible costs).
(b) the fact one already has p and has the goal to continue to have p ('maintenance' goals in CohenLevesque terminology); in case of failure one passes from having p -as desired -to no longer having p (contrary to desire); in this case we have a 'loss': the welfare of the agent is decreased.
The surface form regards the linguistic form of the promise-threat: the use of the P face or of the T face. In table 5 , on the columns we have loss and gains -in the sense that in the first column are considered those cases in which ax will bring to loss for y while in the second to gains-. These two columns represent:
-deep (or substantial) threatening (loss): a choice between two losses ("harm or costs?" no gain), and -deep (or substantial) promises (gain): a choice between a gain (greater then the cost) or a missed gain.
On the rows we have the superficial form of the corresponding communicative acts: in the case of superficial promise what is promised is a missing loss or a gain, while in the case of superficial threat what is promised is a loss or a missing gain. The distinction between the two different surface forms (for a same deep structure) is granted by the IFF form of promises and threats.
What explained in table 5 is the general framework, but if we begin to consider all the possible combinations of actions of the speaker and receiver, with the corresponding values for the counterpart we discover that there are at least 16 different communicative situations. For example we must distinguish "defensive" promises/threats (defensive from x point of view: ay is an action that is not wanted by x, and x uses ax to stop y) from "aggressive" ones (in which ay is something wanted by x). By means of a "grammar" (two general rules of persuasion) we can then reduce them from 16 to 8. The two general rules are:
R1: If x wants to persuade y to perform an action he must enhance the comparative value of that action (i.e. promising something, adding an artificial positive consequence to that action) 
PROMISING or THREATENING? Pragmatics and Social Interaction
The question we address now is why superficially the speaker decides to show the promise or the treath face. Let us call P-form or P-face the presentation of the CIP/T as a Promise, and T-form or T-face the presentation of the CIP/T as a Threat.
On which basis x decides between P-form and T-form? Why and when to make explicit and apparent one facet is better than the other way around? Which are the pragmatic, social and cognitive differences?
There is for sure a criterion of non redundancy (as pointed out in section 2.1) in avoiding the explicit complete expression of a CIP/T. In fact saying "If you do ay I will do ax, but if you do not do ay I will not do ax" is redundant. The second portion is left implicit but part of the intended meaning. So the criterion of redundancy says nothing about explicitly expressing the promise side or the threat side.
Other criteria are needed, and in fact there are several factors at the personality, relational, social, and pragmatic-linguistic layers. These factors are mixed together when deciding for a deep P/T and the corresponding P-face or T-face. We individuate four classes of them: 1) The objective factors depend quite a lot on the kind of incentive power of x. There are two cases:
Positive incentive active power: x is able and in condition through her action ax to produce additional positive gains, incentives for y. Thus the P-face is to do ax and produce the prize; the T-face is just abstaining from ax and not producing the positive incentive. T-form = NotP (no promised prize).
Negative incentives active power. x is able and in condition through her action ax to produce harms, damages for y. Thus the P-face is just abstaining from ax and not producing the 'penalty', while the Tface is doing ax and producing the harm. P-form = NotT (no giving the threatened penalty).
If x has Negative power the T-form should be more direct, clear and natural; while having the Positive power the P-form should prevail.
NegPower: T-form > P-form (= NotT)
PosPower: P-form > T-form (= NotP) 22 2) Some of the factors at the personality and emotional level are:
Y's perceived personality. Is y more sensible and prone to influence by the prospect of losses and harms or more sensible to possible gains?
X's perceived personality Is x for y more credible as a good willing guy, as providing prizes (choosing option a), or as rigorous or hostile guy providing punishments (choosing option b or even a threat)? See the section about P/T credibility and the need for additional motives in x for performing ax in case of failure of the P/T.
Framing effect: A negative/harm framing of the situation induces different reactions and even different reasoning and decision than a positive framing (Framing effect -[Kahneman et al., 82]). X can plan to exploit frame-effect to induce a response that will be different in the two perspectives.
Emotional mediation. If we have an emotional-persuasion use of CIP/T 23 than our prediction is that the P-form is aimed at eliciting attraction while the T-form bets on eliciting fear. The affective response is due to the considered and focused face of the scenario.
3) Some of the factor at the relational and social level are:
X presented social image: the T-face provides a bad face of x, to y and/or to others. Is x interested in presenting such an image of herself? If she likes a nice-gentle guy image she will avoid the T-form, and present himself as a promising guy.
Y relational response:
Will y be more prone to adhere to the request of a gentle guy or to a hungry one? Is he in an opposition-rebel attitude towards x? Or on the contrary he refuses paternalism and caresses from x? If x mainly relies on y's fear, he will prefer the form of threat, focusing y's attention of the possible danger and exhibiting an 'aggressive' face (to make more believable his willingness and disposition to damage). If x mainly relies on exchange, goodwill, positive reciprocation, sympathy, gratitude, etc. he will bet on the 'promise' form. 4) Linguistic and Pragmatic factors: as we saw threats can be more presuppositionally natural in dissuasion, while promises can be more spontaneous in persuasion. So this is an additional reason for presenting one face or the other.
Premise and presupposition: the chosen form may depend also on the presupposition of the sentence and in particular of possible previous linguistic expression of it.
Suppose for example that y said: "I leave; I intend to go". In this context (let's call it: Affirmative presupposition, AffPP) a sentence presupposition that recovers, reproduces it seems a bit preferable; i.e. the form "If you go…" is better than "If you do not go…". 22 We know that a double CIP/T is also possible with two independent prospected harm and advantage. x both disposes of a reward producing act and of a harm producing act and the harm is not just the non-production of the benefit, or the benefit is not simply the nonproduction of the damage. In this case the positive reward is the sum of the NotT plus the prize; while the negative reward is the sum of T plus NotP. This makes thing more complicated. 23 That is if x tries to induce y to do ay by eliciting an emotional reaction ( [Guerini et al., 03] ; [Miceli et al.] ) If x has NegPower (when x disposes of a harm producing act and the harm is not just the non-production of the benefit): When there is a distinct Pos and Neg Power, i.e. when x both disposes of a incentive producing act and of a harm producing act and the harm is not just the non-production of the benefit, or the benefit is not simply the non-production of the damage: Obviously these are only questionable intuitions, just speaker's judgments. Experimental data would be needed for establishing the real context-dependent preferences of speaker between P-face and T-face.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we analysed the concepts of Promises and Threats giving some insight on their nature and their relations. The aim was to study the persuasive aspects and condition of use of such social acts. This analysis served also to throw, throughout the article, some light on related concepts (such as offer, request, blackmail, persuasion and dissuasion). It is not true that P are for persuasion while T are for dissuasion; also because persuasion can imply dissuasion and vice versa.
A general definition of P/T was given using the concept of "speech acts creating social-commitments". Then a concise theory of persuasion, as an influencing aim of the sender, was introduced using the concept of "action inducement goal", and different notion of persuasion (weak and strong definition, dissuasion) were proposed. P entails various kinds of Social-Commitments of both x to y, and y to x; and also T entail Social Commitments.
Not all promises and threats are for persuasion or conditional in their nature (like in "if you do your homework I will bring you to the cinema"): we presented four different typologies of promises and threats (distinguished on the conditional/non-conditional dimension and on their influencing/noninfluencing aim).
We then focused exactly on those conditional P/T that are intended to influence the audience (CIP/T) -those that have a persuasive impact on him -. In our analysis CIP/T are Incentive-Based influencing actions for overcoming y's resistance to influence; they are based on x's power over y's goals; CIP/T presupposes a dependence/power relation. We analyse the typical and necessary presuppositions of CIP vs. CIT; their plan structure; their specific Social Commitments.
We claimed that in CIP/T class the concepts of threat and promise are strictly connected. Since the logical form of these social acts is an iff -and not just an if then-a promise act is always and necessarily (although hiddenly) accompanied (and supported) by an act of threat, and vice versa. So they can be considered as two faces of the same coin.
Thus we discussed the problem of why the speaker decides to show one (the benevolent) face or the other (the aggressive one) and which are the criteria for such a presentation. We also identified -beyond the rhetorical presentation -a more deep difference: a "real" threat (independent of the presented 'face') consisting in a choice between two losses, two penalties, compared with normal promises/threats where the choice is between a gain and a missed-gain.
We also identified a paradox of CIP/T that should be non-credible in principle since the speaker has no reasons for doing what promised in case of both failure or success, and this should be known by the addressee. Additional reasons are necessary for keeping the CIP/T.
